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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Better late than never.  From an economic perspective, the per se rule against 
resale price maintenance1—established by the 1911 Supreme Court decision, Dr. 
Miles2—was unquestionably one of the worst antitrust decisions of the twentieth 
century.3 Yet, in intransigent and pertinacious fashion, the Court refused to overrule 
its former erroneous decision despite having had several opportunities to do so.4 As a 
result, and notwithstanding the bedrock principle that antitrust cases must make 
                                                                
*Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP; BBL (Int’l), University College Dublin, Ireland; J.D., 
Stanford Law School; LL.M, J.S.D., University of Chicago Law School. 
1Minimum resale price maintenance refers to the practice wherein a manufacturer sells its 
produce to distributors, but insists that the latter not sell to consumers below a certain price. 
2Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
3While not all would agree with the proposition that a per se rule against resale price 
maintenance is fatuous, I find no rationality in such a prohibitionary rule. My view is 
ubiquitously shared by leading economists and also held by a large number of leading antitrust 
scholars. See Economists’ Brief (arguing for repeal of the per se rule); RICHARD POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW 171-89 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed. 2001); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 280-98 (N.Y. Free Press 2d ed. 1993). 
4The Court was asked to revisit the per se rule, or at least the rule’s raison d’être, on many 
occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United States v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); 
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365 (1967); Albrecht  v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 
(1984); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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economic sense,5 the rule that vertically imposed minimum price-based restraints are 
illegal has remained in force for almost a hundred years.6  The Supreme Court’s 
2007 decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.7 to overrule 
Dr. Miles, then, was not so much an iconoclastic judgment as it was a long overdue 
implementation of ubiquitously accepted principles of price theory.  
Nevertheless, the case arguably stands for more than the correction of a century-
old mistake. It sends a meaningful message about the direction the Roberts Court is 
taking in analytic jurisprudence. The stare decisis principle generally requires the 
Supreme Court to follow its prior determinations.8 As described by the Ninth Circuit, 
“the doctrine of stare decisis concerns the holdings of previous cases, not the 
rationales.”9 Assuming the normative legitimacy of the doctrine, Leegin provided a 
paradigmatic example of a case in which the status quo should have been preserved 
and arguments for change rejected. There was no interpretive question as to the 
“what,” rather the case was concerned with the “why.” In other words, the rule set 
down in Dr. Miles was both unequivocal and firmly established. Under pure 
principles of stare decisis, this should have been enough to affirm the precedent. Yet, 
the Court went the other way and, as Justice Breyer stressed in dissent, all relevant 
factors weighing on the applicability of stare decisis weighed against the majority’s 
decision.10 
And so enters the crux of the decision—what was the trigger for the fervent 
dissent? In my opinion, the dissent in Leegin is not concerned with the social 
ramifications of a rule of reason approach. Rather, the dissent is all about one, 
seemingly unrelated issue: abortion.  The Roberts Court has appeared to some to 
have taken a shift to the right with the addition of its two new members.11 Given the 
left’s perennial fear of having Roe v. Wade12 overturned, for them, judicial deference 
to stare decisis is of the utmost importance.  From their perspective, the addition of 
more right-leaning justices is a source of significant concern.13 Not surprisingly, 
                                                                
5See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 594, n.19, 596-97)  
(noting that “[l]ike all antitrust cases, this one must make economic sense”). 
6Ninety-six years to be precise. 
7127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
8See, e.g., Tom Hardy, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out? Societal Reliance and the Supreme 
Court’s Modern Stare Decisis Analysis, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591, 592-95 (charting a 
rough history of the principle of stare decisis). 
9In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original). 
10Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2734-35 (2007). 
11See, e.g., Charles Lane, Roberts Court Shifts Right: Recent, Bitterly Contested Decisions 
Underscore New Conservative Ideology with Potential to Change Rulings that once Seemed 
Definitive, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 2007, at C3; Charles Lane, Split Roberts Court Cements Shift to 
the Right, SEATTLE TIMES June 29, 2007, at A18. 
12410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
13See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 
(2007) (describing the threat to Roe v. Wade from continuing appointments of conservative 
justices to the Court); Layla Summers, The Future of the Abortion Right: Ayotte v. Planned 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/6
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then, a major factor in the recent confirmation hearings was the nominee’s regard for 
precedent, particularly with regard to the issue of abortion rights.14  The grave 
trepidation for proponents of those rights is that Leegin has undermined stare decisis, 
thus facilitating a future reversal of Roe v. Wade.15  It is likely for this reason that the 
most knowledgeable antitrust Justice authored a dissent that was inimical to sound 
economics, but replete with citations to abortion-related cases discussing precedent.16 
Yet, this Essay argues that not only is the dissent’s focus on stare decisis 
incongruous, it is entirely misplaced.  This case does not constitute, or even 
foreshadow, a portentous and monumental shift in jurisprudential thinking away 
from adherence to precedent and toward the right.  Rather, it reflects the fact that 
Congress left the substance of the antitrust statute—the Sherman Act17—to the 
determination of the Court.  There have been myriad instances in which the Supreme 
Court has revisited and overruled its earlier opinions in this field18 and Leegin 
provides just one more example.  In short, the decision is not the grave threat that it 
may initially have been perceived to be. 
All of this is not to say that Leegin is devoid of future significance. To the 
contrary, the case has significant ramifications for antitrust law itself. Today, it is 
largely settled that consumer welfare19 is of primary importance and that Chicago-
derived principles of economics provide the tools for assessing challenged business 
practices.20 Yet, the Chicago School’s influence is not complete—indeed, many 
observers noted a partial retraction therefrom under the Rehnquist Court.21  
                                                          
Parenthood & The Roberts’ Court, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 669, 688 (2006) 
(“History has shown that the right to abortion is one that evolves given the composition of the 
Court, and thus, new appointments are crucially important to the future and development of 
the right [to abortion].”). 
14See, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 549-555 
(2005) (responses of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., to written questions of Sen. Biden); 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judicary, 109th Cong. 
2-5 (2006) (opening statement by Sen. Specter, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.). 
15See, e.g., id. 
16See Part III infra. 
1715 U.S.C. §1 (2004). 
18See Part III infra. 
19For antitrust purposes, consumer welfare refers to the aggregation of the gap between 
each consumer’s reservation price and the price they actually pay. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, 
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 70-71 (Pearson 4th ed. 2005). 
20See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (holding that the Sherman 
Act creates a "consumer welfare prescription”); BORK, supra note 3, at 280-98 (arguing that 
the sole purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote consumer welfare); William J. Kolasky, 
U.S. and E.U. competition policy: Cartels, Mergers, and Beyond, http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/public/speeches/9848.pdf (noting that “the ultimate goal of any sound competition policy 
must be consumer welfare, which competition advances through lower prices, higher output 
and enhanced innovation”) (last visited March 10, 2008); Chang, Evans & Schmalensee, Has 
the Consumer Harm Standard Lost its Teeth? 1 (Aug. 13, 2002) (AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
Working Paper; MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4263-02, available at http://ssrn.com 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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In Leegin, the Court reversed Dr. Miles and a body of precedent that was replete 
with confused, self-contradictory, and economically illiterate normative foundations. 
In doing so, the Court not only gave force to the decades-old derision of the nearly 
century-old rule banning resale price maintenance22 but signaled a second major step 
toward obeisance to the Chicago School’s focus on price theory.23 This past 
summer’s decision furthers Chicago’s hegemony and raises the crucial question: 
what are the repercussions for antitrust law of this latest move away from Harvard 
and toward Chicago?24 
                                                          
/abstract_id=332021 (“[C]onsumer welfare is the fundamental standard for evaluating 
competitive effects.”) (last visited March 10, 2008). See generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer 
Choice as  the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001). 
21See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could 
Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Chicago World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 193 (1993);  Lawrence T. 
Festa, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fall of the 
Chicago Empire?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619 (1993). 
22Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), established the 
rule that vertically imposed minimum price-based restraints are illegal per se. The rise of the 
Chicago School approach to antitrust analysis saw the introduction of price theory as the sole 
tool by which to inform a competition policy interested only in consumer welfare. See 
generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
925 (1979). Morally derived notions of fairness have no place in Chicago antitrust analysis; 
rather, the maximization of consumer welfare is the sole moral imperative. From this 
ontological perspective, many leading commentators criticized the underlying rationale behind 
Dr. Miles almost to the point of ridicule. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 280-98; POSNER, 
supra note 3, at viii, 176-89 (opining that much of antitrust law in the 1970s was “an 
intellectual disgrace” and noting that Dr. Miles and its progeny’s continuing force in face of 
improvements in other areas “is a sad mistake” given that “[t]here is neither theoretical basis, 
nor empirical support, for thinking the practice generally anticompetitive”). 
23As will be explained in Part IV infra, the Court’s 2006 holding that patents should not be 
presumed to convey market power for the purpose of product tying claims closely matched 
Chicago-derived principles of economic theory. See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34-36 (2006). 
24The terms “Chicago” and “Harvard” in antitrust terminology often take on a somewhat 
nebulous and ill-defined form, so I wish to make my understanding of them clear. By Chicago, 
I refer jointly to what are commonly referred to as the classic Chicago and post-Chicago views 
of competition analysis. Both are solely concerned with maximizing consumer welfare, though 
the latter is less agnostic toward the possibility of anticompetitive conduct. Whereas the 
former called largely for per se legality across the board (with an exception for horizontal 
cartels and mergers to monopoly), the latter has employed price theoretic models 
demonstrating the possibility of anticompetitive behavior in a greater variety of contexts. The 
post-Chicago approach would generally call for rule-of-reason. Both views, however, use the 
principles of economics as the sole lodestar and this exclusive focus is what I refer to when I 
speak of Chicago. With respect to Harvard, I refer to the approach to antitrust that proved 
particularly influential in the Warren Court era. Under this philosophy, socio-political 
preferences weigh in on antitrust analysis and there is a greater level of mistrust of economic 
predictions alone. Relevant considerations may include a fear of concentration and protection 
of politically favored—usually small or family-owned—business. This approach is not 
unconcerned with economic analysis, but is receptive to a more eclectic range of 
considerations. See, e.g., Andreas Kirsch & William Weesner, Can Antitrust Law Control E-
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/6
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As of two years ago, only three areas of antitrust law remained unchanged in the 
face of Chicago-driven principles of price theory—the per se rules against both 
resale price maintenance25 and product tying,26 in addition to the presumption that 
patents confer market power.27 With Leegin, only one remains.28 More specifically, 
now that the per se rule against resale price maintenance has been overruled, the 
prohibition of product tying stands as an anomaly. Accordingly, this Essay considers 
whether the Roberts Court would now overrule the last bastion of the Harvard 
School—the rule against product tying—if given the opportunity. The economic 
arguments against per se treatment of tie-ins apply a fortiori to those against resale 
price maintenance. In addition, applying the line of thought followed by the majority 
in Leegin leads inexorably to the conclusion that the per se rule proscribing tying 
arrangements should be similarly overruled. 
Part II explains the business practice of resale price maintenance and the law’s 
formerly mistaken understanding of its consequences. The Leegin case will then be 
introduced and compendiously detailed. Assuming familiarity with that decision, 
Part III asks whether stare decisis has been dealt a mortal blow, thereby rendering 
abortion rights less secure in the long run. Having answered that question in the 
negative, the Essay proceeds to its most important question: if not relevant to stare 
decisis, what are the repercussions of the judgment? The axiomatic point is that those 
seeking to invalidate minimum resale prices will now face an uphill battle. The 
Essay discusses which arguments would be likely to prevail post-Leegin. The more 
interesting insight, however, relates to an unrelated area of antitrust law, product 
tying. The qualified per se prohibition of tie-ins rests on a flawed economic 
interpretation highly reminiscent of the specious reasoning that supported the rule in 
Dr. Miles. I suggest that tie-ins would perhaps be subjected to rule of reason analysis 
were the Court to subsequently revisit the question. A brief conclusion follows. 
II.  RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND THE LEEGIN DECISION 
A.  The Phenomenon of Resale Price Maintenance 
Resale price maintenance exists when a manufacturer sells its goods to 
distributors and/or retailers, but refuses to give the latter free reign over the price at 
which they wish to sell to consumers. In the context of this Essay, the term refers to 
the more narrow circumstance in which a minimum price is fixed in a vertical 
context.  Since the Supreme Court first ruled on the legality of the practice in 1911,29 
                                                          
Commerce? A Comparative Analysis in Light of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, 12 U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 297, 304-05 (2006). 
25Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. 373. 
26Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992). 
27Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984). 
28In the 2006 term, the Supreme Court overruled the presumption that patents confer 
market power. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 547 U.S. 28. 
29Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. 373. 
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it has been treated as inherently and invariably anticompetitive.30  The first question 
is: why should the practice be per se illegal? 
The Supreme Court’s fatal and long-lasting mistake was to confuse vertical with 
horizontal price-fixing.  The latter is quite properly regarded as illegal in every 
jurisdiction that has a competition statute.  When rivals in the same market meet to 
fix prices, they essentially seek to act as a joint monopolist by reducing output and so 
increasing price.31  The result is an immediate decrease in consumer welfare—those 
consumers at the margin no longer purchase the now-cartelized product, while those 
whose reservation prices exceed the cartel price nevertheless suffer a wealth transfer 
without any cognizable, concomitant gain.32 
Vertical price-fixing is different. Absent a cartel at the manufacturer level, resale 
price maintenance imposed by any given manufacturer is either pro-competitive or 
benign.33  To understand why this is so, picture yourself in the position of a 
manufacturer.  Having produced your products and set your price at a profit-
maximizing level, your challenge now is to find someone to sell those goods to 
consumers on your behalf.  The higher the cost of distribution, the lower your profit.  
As a distributor increases the mark-up between the price you sold at and the price he 
sells at, he makes you worse off by reducing demand for your product.  Imposing a 
maximum resale price can prevent such an event occurring.  Recognizing this at last 
in 1997, the Supreme Court held that vertically imposed maximum price-based 
restraints are no longer illegal per se.34 
But why would it ever be in a manufacturer’s interest to establish a minimum 
price? Surely a manufacturer would like its dealers to sell at as low a price as 
possible so as to increase the demand for its goods? This holds true only if risk is not 
a factor and if all distributors or retailers provide the same level of pre-sale service.35 
Imagine once more that you are a manufacturer, except now you have just 
developed a new product, the consumer demand for which is uncertain. A retailer 
may be reluctant to take on the product line unless it has assurances of enjoying a 
premium to counter the risk involved. A manufacturer’s agreement to establish a 
mutually satisfactory minimum price assures the retailer that if rivals start selling the 
same line in the future, she will not be undercut. Once entry has occurred and the 
retailer is selling the manufacturer’s goods, it is true that consumers would be made 
better off in a single-period by eliminating the minimum price requirement and 
allowing other retailers to compete.  But, of course, this takes for granted that a 
retailer agreed to carry the line in the first place, which is a rather large assumption. 
                                                                
30See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United States v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); 
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365 (1967); Albrecht  v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 
(1984); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
31See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 122-151. 
32See generally POSNER, supra note 3, at 9-32 (describing the costs of monopoly pricing). 
33Id. at 177. 
34State Oil, 522 U.S. 3.  
35See POSNER, supra note 19, at 172. 
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The second instance involves free-riding. If there are a number of retailers selling 
a given manufacturer’s non-fungible goods, each retailer will have an incentive to let 
the others provide expensive pre-sale service and then use the ensuing cost 
differential to profitably undercut them. By imposing a minimum price, a 
manufacturer can prevent such free riding.36 
This is not to say that resale price maintenance is necessarily benign. If there is a 
cartel at the manufacturer-level, the ubiquitous adoption of resale price maintenance 
provides effective means by which each conspirator can monitor the others to ensure 
compliance with the underlying price agreement. Such a monitoring program is 
essential to the efficacy of a cartel, given the fact that each member has a strong 
incentive to deviate.37 Alternatively, if a group of retailers coerce a manufacturer into 
setting a minimum price, it will be in furtherance of a horizontal cartel at the 
distribution level, which is nefarious and worthy of condemnation.38 
There is little need to get into further detail with respect to the economics of 
vertically imposed minimum prices. The economic literature is already replete with 
such analysis and repeating such scholarship here would be of little value. 
Nevertheless, even this brief summary demonstrates that a per se rule against resale 
price maintenance is axiomatically specious. The Supreme Court has reserved such 
prohibitionary treatment for those practices “lacking any redeeming virtue,”39 yet 
minimum resale prices have several. It will suffice to say then that the Supreme 
Court’s prior treatment of resale price maintenance can be characterized only as 
incongruous, obtuse and, worst, contrary to consumer welfare.40 
The Dr. Miles rule and its progeny, characterized by some as an “intellectual 
disgrace,”41 was at last revisited in a meaningful way in the past summer’s decision, 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.42  
B.  The Leegin Decision 
A brief discussion of the facts and holding of the case is important.43 Defendant 
was a manufacturer of leather goods, under the brand name “Brighton,” which it sold 
                                                                
36Id. at 172. 
37Id. at 172. 
38Id. at 177. 
39See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 
472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (quoting N. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
40See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 280-98 (chastising the Supreme Court’s repeated, and 
inconsistent, attempts to make sense of Dr. Miles’ rationale without overruling the case). 
41See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at viiii (referring to a host of non-economic antitrust 
rules, including by implication the law governing resale price maintenance, as an “intellectual 
disgrace”). 
42127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
43This Essay will not engage in an exhaustive regurgitation of the facts and law espoused 
by the Court. The point of this Essay is to interpret the cause and consequences of the Leegin 
decision rather than to summarize the case extensively. Those wishing to gain a more 
thorough knowledge of the Court’s holding should read the opinion itself. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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to Plaintiff PSKS—the operator of a women’s apparel store.44  Leegin imposed a 
vertical minimum price policy pursuant to which it would refuse to sell to any 
retailer violating that suggested price.45  Leegin learned that PSKS was selling its 
Brighton products at twenty percent below its suggested price and consequently 
refused to sell any more of those goods to the store.46  Suit quickly followed and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether it should revisit the rule in 
Dr. Miles that minimum vertical price agreements are illegal per se.47 
In the closest possible decision, the Supreme Court reversed Dr. Miles by a 5-4 
vote.48 Justice Kennedy, who wrote the opinion of the Court, began by noting that 
most agreements subjected to antitrust scrutiny should be assessed under the “rule of 
reason,” which involves a fact-finder weighing “all of the circumstances of a case in 
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.”49 From there, the Court referred to the 
economic conclusions articulated in Part II.A supra and observed that the 
“economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for a 
manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance.”50 As a result, it concluded that per 
se treatment is inappropriate.51 However, given the potential for anticompetitive 
practices,52 the Court held that rule of reason, as opposed to per se legality, was the 
correct approach.53 
The dissent is of equal interest. Justice Breyer practically fulminated at what he 
regarded as the Court’s callous disregard of principles of stare decisis.54 While he 
conceded that if the Court was considering the matter for the first time it would have 
been a difficult issue he emphasized that they were not writing on a blank slate.55 He 
proceeded to make an ostensibly compelling argument that the per se rule against 
resale price maintenance was a highly inappropriate one to overrule. More 
specifically, every single principle followed by the Court in deciding to overrule 
prior precedents counseled against doing so here.56 
                                                                
44Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710-11  (2007).. 
45Id. 
46Id. 
47Id. at 2712. 
48Id. at 2710. 
49Id. at 2712. 
50Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714. 
51Id. at 2715. 
52See discussion supra Part II.A. 
53Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717-19. 
54Id. at 2734-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
55Id. at 2726, 2735. 
56Id. at 2734-35. 
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First, stare decisis applies “more rigidly in statutory than in constitutional cases;” 
yet Leegin involved the construction of a statute.57 Second, “the Court does 
sometimes overrule cases that it decided wrongly only a reasonably short time 
ago.”58 But the Dr. Miles rule was almost a century old. Third, “the fact that a 
decision creates an “unworkable” legal regime argues in favor of overruling.”59 
Justice Breyer could find no basis for believing that a rule of reason would be more 
workable than the per se standard. Fourth, “the fact that a decision “unsettles” the 
law may argue in favor of overruling.”60 Yet, the per se rule was well-settled for an 
elongated period of time. Fifth, “the fact that a case involves property rights or 
contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, argues against overruling.”61 
Justice Breyer argued forcefully that industry has relied on the per se standard since 
the Dr. Miles rule was established.62 
Despite these compelling points, something seems somewhat out of place given 
Justice Breyer’s reputation as one of the Court’s leading antitrust experts. He went 
against a decision backed by economists, antitrust scholars, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and Justice Department, amongst others.  Part III infra explores what 
this Essay believes to be the true impetus for Justice Breyer’s dissent. 
III.  A VEILED THREAT TO ABORTION RIGHTS? 
The heart of Justice Breyer’s dissent lay in his reverence for precedent. One 
suspects, however, that the force of his opposition came from a matter unrelated to 
antitrust doctrine. In this regard, he cited a number of abortion cases several times in 
support of stare decisis.63 The significance of this is only magnified when one 
remembers that the case involves antitrust issues only and is far removed from the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
One need not be clairvoyant to see where Justice Breyer’s concerns lay. By 
diminishing its deference to precedent, the Court necessarily undermines the security 
of other decisions that some people may hold dear. As a result, proponents of Roe v. 
Wade would likely look on the Leegin decision with some consternation. If cases 
such as Leegin establish a precedent for overruling firmly established and long-held 
decisions, future constituents of a yet more conservative Court would have less 
difficulty ruling that the liberty protected by substantive due process does not include 
a woman’s right to an abortion. 
Yet, such a Pavlovian response to the Leegin decision may be both myopic and 
mistaken. There is cause for concern only if Justice Kennedy’s approach to stare 
decisis was distinctly differentiable to that taken in earlier antitrust cases. The most 
                                                                
57Id. at 2734. 
58Id. 
59Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at  2734. 
60Id. at 2735. 
61Id.  
62Id. at 2735-36. 
63See, e.g., id. at 2731 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) and Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 
2652 (2007)); id. at 2734-35 (citing Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007)). 
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rudimentary study of past decisions of the Court reveals that such is not the case. 
Indeed, the reversal of prior interpretations of the Sherman Act is almost the norm, 
rather than the exception. 
Consider some relatively recent instances in which the Court was asked to 
overturn its prior interpretation of the Sherman Act. Before the 2006 case, Illinois 
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,64 it was well established that patents confer 
market power for the purposes of product tying claims. Yet, as in Leegin, the 
economic evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the prevailing rule was 
erroneous. Recognizing this, the Court held that plaintiffs in tying cases involving 
patents must show that the holder of the patent actually possesses the power to 
control price and exclude entry.65 In 1997, the Court overturned the settled rule that 
maximum resale price maintenance is per se illegal.66 In 1984, the Court overruled its 
prior decision that a corporation could conspire with a wholly owned subsidiary for 
purposes of Section One of the Sherman Act.67 In 1977, it had been long settled that 
vertical nonprice restraints were illegal per se, but the Court once again saw little 
difficulty in looking past stare decisis to alter its prior decision.68 In the same year, 
the Court altered the per se rule against product tying to require proof of market 
power on the part of the tying party.69  
These cases are but a sample of the instances in which the Supreme Court has 
seen fit to reverse its earlier determinations of antitrust law. From this perspective, 
Justice Breyer’s dissent seems quite weak. Accordingly, there seems to be little 
direct reduction in the Court’s deference to precedent in Leegin. As the majority 
noted, the Sherman Act is effectively a common law statute which has been left to 
the Court to substantiate as it sees fit.70 
This Essay does not suggest that proponents of abortion rights have no reason to 
be wary of the Roberts Court. It does argue, however, that the extent of any such 
concern should be neither elevated nor diminished by Leegin. Despite the dissent’s 
vociferous cries to the contrary, from a positive standpoint, stare decisis has neither 
contemporaneous nor historical potence in the antitrust context. From a normative 
perspective too, there is little reason to support dogmatic adherence to prior 
hermeneutic interpretations of the Sherman Act’s open-ended provisions. Antitrust is 
a peculiar area of law in that it is largely, if not now exclusively, informed by 
economic policy. As our understanding of economics increases, so too does our 
understanding of business practices formerly, and erroneously, construed as 
anticompetitive. Stare decisis should not present a significant obstacle to the 
correction of previous mistakes formed on the basis of inadequate information. 
                                                                
64547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
65Id. 
66State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997). 
67Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). 
68Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) 
69U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 613 (1977). 
70Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720-21 (2007). 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/6
2008] ON THE RAMIFICATIONS OF LEEGIN 397 
IV.  LIKELY RAMIFICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY 
A.  Attacking Resale Price Maintenance After Leegin 
The easy lesson to draw from Leegin is what plaintiffs will have to show in the 
future to successfully challenge a vertical minimum price agreement. The Court’s 
decision made this clear. First, cases in which a plaintiff can establish that a 
manufacturer or dealer cartel existed will be subject to continuing per se illegality.71 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted that such plaintiffs may be aided in their quest by 
pointing to pervasive resale price maintenance policies which provide “useful 
evidence” thereof.72 Second, the existence of market power in either level of the 
vertical chain increases the potential for anticompetitive effect.73 Third, and 
consistent with Judge Posner’s charge,74 the source of the minimum price agreement 
is critical. If the deal emanates from the dealers, it is almost certainly 
anticompetitive.75 
An entity seeking to establish the illegality of resale price maintenance in the 
post-Leegin world should concentrate on these factors. The more interesting 
remaining question pertains to the effect of Leegin on other areas of antitrust law. 
B.  Are Tie-Ins Next? 
Some readers may be surprised to see a connection being drawn between the 
Court’s treatment of resale price maintenance and the law governing product tying. 
Yet, the foregoing discussion emphasized that the Roberts Court appears to have 
adopted an exclusively economic approach. Illustrative of this is the fact that all nine 
justices accepted economics’ lesson that vertically imposed minimum price-based 
restraints are capable of having pro-competitive effect. The days of the Warren Court 
are long gone indeed.76 
First, what is product tying and, second, why does Leegin undermine the 
contemporary law governing the practice? To answer the first question: Product 
tying occurs when a seller conditions the sale of a product or service (“the tying 
product”) on the purchase of a second product or service (“the tied product”).77 
Bundling—a closely related concept—is said to exist when two or more products are 
sold in fixed proportions; while requirements tie-in sales involve consumers being 
                                                                
71Id. at 2733. 
72Id. at 2734. 
73Id. at 2735. 
74See POSNER, supra note 3, at 177. 
75Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2733. 
76See Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 
74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226-28 (1995) (charting and contrasting the history of the Warren Court 
approach to antitrust policy). 
77See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 291, 318. 
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compelled under contract, or otherwise,78 to purchase all future tied products from 
the tying firm.79  
The Supreme Court traditionally held that “tying arrangements serve hardly any 
purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”80  As a result, tie-ins were, and to a 
considerable extent still are, illegal per se.  In modern times, however, product tying 
is subject to a qualified form of per se illegality.  In order for a tie-in to automatically 
violate the Sherman Act the tying party must possess market power in the tying 
market.81 
Despite the Court’s dislike of tying arrangements, contemporary principles of 
price theory reveal them to be pro-competitive in all but the most restricted 
circumstances. If one adopts the accepted view in the United States that antitrust 
laws exist solely to promote consumer welfare,82 then it is difficult to envisage how 
product ties can be harmful.  I have charted the reasons for this in detail in another 
article,83 but for the purposes of this Essay, an overview of the relevant economic 
insights will suffice. 
First, to harm consumers, a tying firm must employ its tie to extract wealth from 
its customers in a tied market.  To do this, it must have a literal monopoly, or virtual 
monopoly, in the tying market.  If a firm lacking monopoly power attempts to 
impose an unwelcome tie on its customers, those clients will go to a rival firm that 
does not insist on such a tie.  However, even a monopoly is insufficient in itself. For 
the tying firm to acquire monopoly market share in the tied market, the relationship 
between the tying and tied markets must be such that consumers derive a greater 
degree of utility from the former.  In any other situation, an unwelcome tie would 
lead consumers to forego the tying product and purchase the tied product directly 
instead.  If all these conditions are met, a firm may be able to employ a tie to 
“monopolize” a tied market.  Notice, however, that the prerequisite for this is a level 
of monopoly power far exceeding that required for establishing a violation of Section 
Two of the Sherman Act.84  Thus, the current per se rule erroneously forbids tie-ins 
that are incapable of harming consumers. 
Second, and counter-intuitively, successful “monopolization” of a tied market 
through a tying arrangement does not directly facilitate the use of market power 
                                                                
78Various pricing techniques such as discount rebates may be found to have an equivalent 
effect to a contractual tie. 
79CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 321. 
80United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1962) (citing Standard Oil Co. of Cal. 
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)). 
81See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 613 (1977). 
82See supra text accompanying note 20. 
83Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Product Tying, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 
521 (2007). 
84The Supreme Court has generally established market power from market share for the 
purpose of Section Two liability. Seventy-five percent share has been found to constitute 
monopoly power by the Court. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 
377, 391-92, 425 (1956). Obviously, such market share falls well short of the literal or near-
literal monopoly required to facilitate effective monopolization of a tied market, which would 
require there to be no appreciable rival presence in the tying market. 
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there. Even the successful acquisition of monopoly market share in a tied market 
may not lead to consumer injury.  The idea that market power can be transferred 
from one market to another is known as monopoly leverage and is fundamentally 
flawed. The fact that a tying firm manages to acquire 100% market share in a tied 
market does not mean that the combined levels of consumer welfare in the tying and 
tied markets will fall.  The “single monopoly mark-up constraint” prevents a firm 
acquiring two monopoly profits through one tie. When two products are tied, 
increasing the price of one is equivalent to increasing the price of the other and 
leaving the first intact.  If a monopolist imposes a tie, presumably it was charging a 
profit-maximizing price in the tying market to begin with. If it subsequently acquires 
complete market share in a second market by virtue of a tie and then increases the 
price there, its move would be equivalent to setting a price for the tying product 
above the profit-maximizing level. This, of course, would be irrational.85 
The only major way such a tie can reduce consumer welfare is where there are 
insurmountable entry barriers in the tied market such that the tying firm, having 
monopolized the tied market, can then cut the tie and charge two separate monopoly 
prices.  However, the only markets likely to be characterized by such barriers would 
be those subject to governmental regulation.86 Accordingly, they are easily 
recognizable by the courts.  
The preceding discussion highlights the extremely limited circumstances in 
which tying arrangements may harm welfare. Yet, if there were no benefit associated 
with the practice, even limited instances of harm would justify prohibition. 
Importantly, however, there are myriad efficiency gains inherent in almost every tie-
in.  First, complementary effects lead a firm employing a tie to reduce joint price and 
increase joint output, thus elevating both its own profits and consumer welfare.87 
Second, there are many transaction cost efficiencies associated with tying 
arrangements.88 Consider the quantity of tie-ins encountered in day-to-day life that 
unequivocally enhance consumer welfare: remotes are often sold with batteries 
(consider the annoyance when they’re not!); buttons come with shirts; computers are 
sold with operating software pre-installed; cars are sold with a spare tire; and so on. 
Third, tying arrangements can facilitate efficient forms of price discrimination.89 
To date, these economic insights have yet to persuade the Supreme Court to 
reverse the per se treatment of tie-ins. However, signs of a move away from the 
Court’s hard-line position have been visible. First, a less conservative Court has 
come close to adopting a rule of reason approach in the past.90 Second, the Microsoft 
case saw the D.C. Circuit enunciate a rule of reason approach to product tying in the 
context of high-technology, software markets.91 
                                                                
85See generally BORK, supra note 3, at 365-381. 
86See Devlin, supra note 83, at 551-57 (explaining these points in greater detail). 
87CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 638. 
88See, e.g., id. at 319. 
89See Devlin, supra note 83, at 543-47. 
90Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 32 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing 
for rejection of the per se illegal standard in tying cases). 
91United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F. 3d 935, 949–50 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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What has changed with the decision in Leegin? The Court now appears more 
receptive than ever to economic arguments of the kind supporting adoption of a rule 
of reason standard.  The simple fact that a prohibitionary rule has existed for some 
time is no longer sufficient to maintain a status quo inconsistent with sound 
economics.  As mentioned, economists ubiquitously deride the per se prohibition of 
tying arrangements.92  Looking at the majority decision in Leegin, it is impossible not 
to draw parallels between the treatment of tie-ins and resale price maintenance in the 
context of sound economic policy. Consider how Justice Kennedy’s analysis would 
apply to the case of tying arrangements: 
First, his emphasis that rule of reason analysis is the accepted general standard 
would counsel against the current per se rule against tie-ins.93 Second, the Court’s 
requirement that per se illegality be reserved for business practices “with no 
redeeming virtue” would exclude tying arrangements from such treatment. As 
articulated above, and as with resale price maintenance, “the economics literature is 
replete with procompetitive justifications [for the practice].”94 Third, Justice 
Kennedy noted that former determinations are entitled to less weight if the Court 
then “failed to consider” the economics we now understand.95 As with resale price 
maintenance, full understanding of the effect of tie-ins is a relatively new 
phenomenon. 
Given the weakness of stare decisis in the antitrust field, this Essay suggests that 
the Roberts Court may well be able to muster the majority needed to overrule the 
clearly erroneous prohibition of product tying. The Court came close in 1984, with 
four justices arguing for a rule of reason approach in dissent.96 It seems likely 
looking at Leegin that the current Court would do better. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay has argued that the Leegin decision poses no threat to those who 
desire to see the continuing force of Roe v. Wade and its progeny. What, then, are the 
repercussions of the decision? Obviously, those retailers seeking to undercut their 
manufacturers’ vertically imposed prices will now have a more difficult time 
establishing the illegality of those price restraints. Part IV outlined the manner in 
which such retailers may nevertheless properly attempt to do so.97   
Yet, the impact of Leegin transcends the boundaries of the business practice there 
in issue and, so, a more perspicacious insight is possible.  
                                                                
92See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 197-207; BORK, supra note 3, at 365-81; David S. 
Evans & Michael Salinger, Why do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive 
Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2005); Ward S. Bowman, 
Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). 
93Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13 (2007). 
94Id. at 2714. 
95Id. 
96Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
97See supra Part IV.A. 
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The Sherman Act is an infamously nebulous statute, devoid of explicit 
congressional demand.98  Accordingly, it has always been a vehicle for judge-made 
principles of competition law that have evolved in line with the Justices’ economic 
and political leanings.99  It is, without question, a statute highly pre-disposed to 
polytheistic modes of interpretation.  What makes Leegin most significant, I argue, is 
its resounding adoption of economics as the sole analytic tool in antitrust analysis.  
Though the Court’s approach falls short of the per se legal ideal of the classic 
Chicago School,100 the Chicago focus on economic reasoning through the lens of 
price theory is prevalent throughout the Court’s opinion.  While it is true that the 
post-Warren Court era has seen several antitrust rules struck down or rendered 
obsolete on the ground of being inconsistent with economic reasoning,101 the per se 
rule against minimum resale prices was arguably the most firmly engrained and 
certainly the longest-running.  Leegin marks the end of two active years for antitrust 
issues before the Court102 and the message could not be more clear: this is the 
beginning of an age in which a high level of economic sophistication is the new 
benchmark. From this perspective, and given the substance of the majority’s 
argumentation, this Essay suggests that the per se rule against product tying has been 
severely undermined. Time will tell whether that prohibitionary rule—now the last 
bastion of the Harvard School—will survive for long. 
                                                                
98See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 
CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1067 n.94 (noting that the provisions of the Sherman Act are 
“notoriously vague” and the substance of the law has been “defined almost entirely by court 
decisions”).  
99See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 78, at 226-28 (describing the Harvard School's influence on 
antitrust policy during the Warren Court era and the subsequent rise of the Chicago and post-
Chicago Schools respectively). 
100See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 280-98. The fact that the majority in Leegin did not 
adopt a per se legal approach is not necessarily a negative. As Judge Posner has written, “it 
makes all the difference whether minimum retail prices are imposed by the manufacturer in 
order to evoke point-of-sale services or by the dealers in order to obtain monopoly profits.” 
POSNER, supra note 3, at 177. 
101See supra Part II.B. 
102See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber, 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007); 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing, 127 S. 
Ct. 2383 (2007). A discussion of these cases is beyond the confines of this essay, though I note 
that these cases too are noteworthy for their adoption of economic analysis. 
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